oversees all brokerage firms and brokers in the United States. 5 In January of this year, the U.S.
Supreme Court declined to review a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Standard Investment Chartered Inc. v. NASD, holding that SROs were absolutely immune from suit after allegations by a NASD member that NASD fraudulently made misstatements in a proxy solicitation that amended the NASD bylaws in connection with creating FINRA. 6 The Second Circuit held that the proxy solicitation to amend NASD's bylaws constituted a regulatory function, thereby denying any redress for the plaintiffs based on the doctrine of absolute immunity for SROs' quasi-governmental functions. 7 The Supreme Court passed on the opportunity to address the constitutionality of absolute immunity for SROs despite allegations that NASD officers were financially motivated to promote the bylaw amendments for reasons besides that of solely effecting the merger. 8 The bylaw amendments would change the NASD's voting structure from a "one member, one vote" system to one based on member firm size, 9 thereby creating voting disadvantages for smaller firms. Plaintiffs also questioned the truthfulness of the defendant's statement in the proxy solicitation that $35,000 was the maximum one-time incentive payment that could be made to member firms in exchange for voting to approve the bylaw amendments. functions to seemingly private, corporate activities. This Article will propose that the farreaching absolute immunity doctrine should be curtailed in instances of alleged fraud, which would allow plaintiffs some form of legal recourse for times in which SROs have stepped outside of their quasi-governmental roles to act more like private bodies. In response to concerns that the institution of such an exception would open the floodgates to an overwhelming flurry of lawsuits, this Article will argue that the existing heightened pleading requirements required for fraud claims would help to eliminate suits against SROs alleging fraud that have no merit. At the same time, however, plaintiffs would have some forum available to seek damages in instances of well-supported fraud allegations. Further, another layer of protection from frivolous lawsuits is available through the SEC's required preliminary administrative review of aggrieved plaintiffs'
claims against SROs. Such review screens claims of SRO error or misconduct from an administrative standpoint before having a chance to reach the courts.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the structure of self-regulatory organizations, while focusing on the dual nature of their public and private functions and FINRA. Part II examines the current case law addressing the absolute immunity doctrine as applied to SROs and the evolution of this doctrine over recent years to encompass an everincreasing range of arguably private duties. This section will also address courts' analyses of a possible fraud exception to the absolute immunity doctrine and reasons for historically rejecting such a carve-out. Part III will highlight the importance of ensuring SRO accountability in light of documented shortfalls of SEC oversight, FINRA shortcomings with respect to efficiency and transparency, and the inability of aggrieved plaintiffs to seek redress for any alleged instances of SRO fraud. This section will consider the fraud exception as a check on instances of SRO fraud, misconduct, and bad faith.
Part IV will respond to the most common arguments against the institution of a fraud exception by considering the requirement for heightened pleading standards in cases of fraud, as well as plaintiffs' obligation to exhaust administrative reviews prior to bringing a lawsuit, as methods of weeding out meritless suits to avoid disrupting the courts. This Article will highlight the ways in which SROs have "stepped out of the shoes" of the SEC over recent years, thereby weakening the proposition that such entities are subject to absolute immunity without question.
By examining the fine line that exists between public and private SRO activities and the potentiality for significant overlap of these two functions, this Article will propose a fraud exception as one method of allowing plaintiffs some recourse when SROs should be held accountable.
I. SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS
Prior to the enactment of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") 11 , securities exchanges had already enjoyed nearly one hundred and forty years of self-governing, implementing their own rules and requirements for members listing securities on such exchanges. 12 The Exchange Act retained this traditional system of self-regulation but, for the first time, required every national securities exchange to register with the SEC. 13 Pursuant to the Exchange Act, stock exchanges exercise regulatory authority over their members and may take disciplinary action against members to ensure compliance with the securities laws, which may consist of denying membership or participation in the applicable exchange, limiting services offered by the exchange to members, or the imposition of sanctions on any person associated with a stock exchange member.
14 Stock exchanges such as the NYSE enforce rules relating to transactions on the exchange and the internal operations of member firms while interacting with customers. 15 Stock exchanges are also required to give the SEC notice of any disciplinary actions that they take against members of the exchange. 16 The SEC has oversight authority over the activities of stock exchanges, including the approval or amendment of exchange rules, enforcement and discipline of the exchange, and a role in structuring the market.
17
The original Exchange Act did not extend federal regulation to non-exchange or over-the- 25 See supra note 6 ("In their proprietary capacity, SROs are similar to other corporations, their conduct toward their members being the subject of regulation, rather than constituting an act of delegated regulatory authority.") 26 Id. (noting that NASD's corporate charter indicates that one of its purposes is to transact business and manage or acquire any real and personal property necessary for the purposes of the corporation). 27 Weissman, 500 F.3d at 1299 (finding that particular advertisements alleged by the plaintiff "were in no sense coterminous with the regulatory activity contemplated by the Exchange Act.").
members. 28 SROs make available to investors the background and prior disciplinary information of their registered brokers, establish requirements for companies that list on the exchanges for trading, and impose minimum corporate governance requirements. 29 One scholar notes that if
SROs were not delegated with these quasi-governmental activities, it is likely that some other government agency would be instead.
30
The concern associated with the dual public/private nature of SROs is that such entities appear to be conveniently targeted as "quasi-governmental" organizations when it comes to immunity protections, as SROs enjoy the same safeguards against litigation as the government. being imposed on the member. 33 Although SROs are entitled to absolute immunity when standing in the shoes of the SEC to carry out the regulatory duties with which the SEC has tasked them, the "SRO transforms itself into a non-governmental private entity, thereby denying the party of any relief" when targets of SRO investigations attempt to invoke constitutional protections. 34 In this way, SROs are benefiting from the best of both worlds -they are shielded from lawsuits as "quasi-governmental" bodies but are simultaneously not required to offer the same type of constitutional protections that are typical of government agencies. These figures bring to light the concern that private financial regulators are receiving a paycheck that is above and beyond that of a governmental employee. FINRA offers its executive officers "million-dollar pay packages that are far more typical of for-profit corporations than government agencies and nonprofit corporations." 47 Although it is not unreasonable to expect that compensation for those employed in private entities may be higher than that of governmental agencies, this discrepancy offers another example of the ways in which SROs are deemed private organizations for purposes that are beneficial to them. However, when it comes to offering constitutional protections, SROs portray characteristics of non-governmental entities. In this way, "[F]INRA has become a government regulator cloaked in the garb of a private association." 48 As will be further explored in this Article, discrepancies such as these have incited debate as to whether SROs should continue to enjoy absolute immunity from suit, notwithstanding the long-held judicial belief that SROs are entitled to full protection from damages when they are carrying out delegated, regulatory duties. 44 Burcher, supra note 43. 45 Barrett, supra note 43. 46 Id. 47 Orenbach, supra note 41, at 140. 48 Id. at 202.
II. SRO IMMUNITY THROUGH THE EYES OF THE COURTS
A.
Current Legal Status of SRO Immunity
SROs are entitled to absolute immunity from suits seeking private damages in connection with the discharge of their regulatory and oversight responsibilities, 49 and are protected from liability for both their actions and omissions in this regard. 50 Absolute immunity offers protection from civil liability "unconditionally", offering immunity "regardless of any other consideration", including acts that arise from malice or corruption. Plaintiffs alleged that NASD misrepresented that $35,000 was the maximum amount that the Internal Revenue Service permitted NASD to make to its members. 57 The Second Circuit found that the proxy solicitation's changes to the NASD voting structure in connection with the bylaws amendments constituted an exercise of NASD's regulatory function. The Second Circuit upheld the district court's analysis that the proxy solicitation was "incident to" NASD's exercise of regulatory power since it was "the only vehicle available to NASD for amending its bylaws" to effect the merger. 58 In so ruling, the Second Circuit expanded the SRO absolute immunity doctrine from SRO direct acts of regulatory activity to acts that are merely "incident to" SRO members to the SEC and other government agencies for civil enforcement or criminal prosecution; and the public announcement of regulatory decisions. 60 Various amicus briefs were filed in support of the plaintiffs, one of which claimed that the Second Circuit drastically expanded SRO immunity far beyond the function-based immunity test typically applied to non-sovereign actors. 61 The function-based test is more limited than the blanket immunity available to sovereign federal and state governments. 62 One amicus brief focused on the need for private suit to counteract expansive SRO power that is not accountable to the executive branch and is subject to diminished oversight. 63 Other arguments focused on the extension of immunity as appropriate only to granted or delegated regulatory powers and never to alleged fraud in proxy solicitations that are instrumental in carrying out private, commercial, or business transactions. 64 In contrast to the Second Circuit's extension of absolute immunity to SROs acting beyond the scope of specific, delegated powers, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted a more limited approach by refusing to grant SROs absolute immunity for all actions that are "merely 'consistent with' their delegated powers." 65 NASDAQ's own business, not the government's, and such distinctly nongovernmental conduct is unprotected by absolute immunity.
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The Eleventh Circuit therefore upheld the decision of the district court to deny the defendants' motion to dismiss and refused to grant SROs absolute immunity for activities that appear to be private and proprietary. There is, however, ambiguity as to whether The Wall Street
Journal advertisements constituted quasi-governmental activities, as Judge Pryor noted in his separate opinion, in which he concurred in part and dissented in part.
In his dissent, Judge Pryor argued that the SEC has delegated to NASDAQ the duty to establish sound financial standards for its listed companies. 74 Since NASDAQ communicated these standards to the public via The Wall Street Journal advertisement, NASDAQ would be entitled to absolute immunity for such actions. 75 The dissent argued that the inquiry as to whether SRO conduct represents a function "delegated by the SEC" should be evaluated on an objective basis, focusing on how the "reasonable reader" would interpret the alleged conduct of an SRO. 76 In this case, the reasonable reader would interpret the advertisements as a communication that WorldCom was listed on NASDAQ because it met the requisite financial standards and that decisions to list or delist securities are considered delegated, regulatory duties to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts.
77 73 Id. at 1299. 74 Id. at 1300. 75 Id. (citing D'Alessio, 258 F.3d at 105 and focusing on whether the conduct performed by NASDAQ is "a function delegated by the SEC"). 76 Id. (The dissent noted that it considers allegations from the view of "the reasonable reader" because it makes only reasonable inferences from the facts alleged in the complaint); see also Cavo, supra note 69, at 437-38 (discussing how the majority opinion views regulatory duties too narrowly); see also As non-governmental actors embodying characteristics of both public and private entities, SROs should be subject to some sort of check on their power. We are left to question the extent to which absolute immunity has been stretched beyond its original intent. The origins of absolute immunity were initially only intended to protect parties undertaking traditional judicial functions. 87 As the law stands now, SROs are subject to the same expansive immunity as the government and the judiciary despite their very different nature. Courts have refused to institute a fraud exception to the absolute immunity doctrine even when acknowledging that allegations against SROs appear "egregious," "badly motivated," "inept" or "unlawful". 88 In NYSE Specialists v. NYSE, the California Public Employees' Retirement System and Empire Programs alleged that NYSE failed to adequately monitor trading and made misrepresentations about the integrity of its market. 89 The plaintiffs claimed that the absolute immunity doctrine was inapplicable since NYSE was not exercising its quasigovernmental duties when it "permitted and encouraged misconduct and fraud on its trading floor." 90 The plaintiffs alleged that the specialist firms executing the actual trading on NYSE took advantage of their position to engage in self-dealing and that NYSE not only neglected its oversight responsibilities over their actions but also encouraged the self-dealing by allegedly falsifying reports and tipping off the specialist firms. 91 In ruling that NYSE was entitled to absolute immunity as an SRO, the court refused to carve out even a "one-time" fraud exception despite egregious allegations of fraud. 92 Such an exception was believed to "open a Pandora's box undermining the entire purpose of the immunity doctrine" and hinder SROs' abilities to carry out their quasi-governmental duties for fear of disruptive and constant lawsuits.
93
These cases demonstrate the most common arguments in support of the courts' refusal to accept a fraud exception in absolute immunity cases against SROs. In protecting an SRO's shield of absolute immunity, courts have historically considered the "balance between the evils" of denying a plaintiff any redress for SRO misconduct and subjecting governmental officials to "the constant dread of retaliation" as they carry out their regulatory duties, finding that the lesser evil Public confidence in the SRO system is further threatened when considering the various deficiencies in SEC oversight over SROs. Since the beginning of federal securities regulation, the SEC has granted stock exchanges "considerable autonomy" . . . "playing an essentially passive role, the SEC has allowed the securities industry to govern itself in its own wisdom."
99
The SEC, "a tame watchdog," 100 was tasked with a "residual role" when it comes to overseeing stock exchanges . . . "[g]overnment would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it would never have to be used."
101
The SEC is effectively on standby to intervene only in the event that an SRO commits a significant abuse. However, this type of oversight is not on par with the adequate supervisory role that justifies the absolute immunity doctrine for SROs.
In May of 2012, the United States Government Accountability Office ("GAO") released a report that outlined the results of a GAO review and assessment of the SEC's oversight 104 Id. at 14 (Through the SEC's process of soliciting comments and conducting reviews of proposed FINRA rules, the SEC gathers information on the potential effects that such rules may have on the industry. However, the SEC has no formal, specific guidance or protocols for conducting retrospective reviews). 105 Id. at 14, 15. 106 Id. 107 Id. at 15 (noting the usefulness of retrospective reviews of rules, including the ability to inform policymakers about the design of rule and regulatory programs of NASD regulations and disciplinary proceedings." 114 These cases demonstrate the extent to which the courts rely on adequate SEC oversight to ensure that there is some mechanism for holding SROs accountable for any wrongdoing. As discussed above, it no longer seems prudent to rely only on SEC oversight given weaknesses in that arena.
Scholars have also noted the limited ability of administrative agencies overseeing SROs to guide SROs toward the direction of the public interest. 115 Since SROs are essential in allowing the market to operate smoothly, government agencies like the SEC may threaten fines and require regulatory reforms, but such agencies are constrained from instituting any reform measures that would cause any market disruption. 116 The ability of the SEC to expand its regulatory oversight is also impeded by considerable budgetary constraints and the need for significant technological advancements, 117 thereby making its goal of aggressively protecting investors from fraud and market abuse increasingly difficult to reach.
118
The belief that SEC oversight is adequate enough to justify absolute SRO immunity should be re-evaluated by courts in light of the results of the GAO report, the excessive compensation packages available to FINRA employees discussed in Part I of this Article, and the ever-increasing ambiguity as to whether SRO actions are public or private functions. 126 At times when FINRA or other self-regulators have inspected major cases of fraud or attempted to implement change, they have tended to follow investigations started by others, such as the Attorney General's office, the SEC, or the news media, 127 rather than initiating their own reviews. While SROs have missed detecting the scandals of major, financial players, they are believed to have targeted "the little guy, sparing the big, deep-pocketed members that wield clout at the marketplace", as most regulatory cases have been brought against individual brokers.
128
Specialists or market makers who work with the stock exchanges to invest or fill orders for clients have also been found to engage in misconduct. NYSE figures have revealed that the volume of trading for which specialists traded for their own individual accounts increased from 18% to 27% between 1996 and 2000, resulting in a rise in specialists' profits during this time.
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The Wall Street Journal articles detailing an SEC investigation of specialist misconduct in 2003
reported that specialist firms on the NYSE had taken advantage of their inside knowledge of the market to interfere in transactions for their own profit and trade for their own accounts before completing orders placed by public investors. 130 Specialist firm violations of NYSE rules and self-interested trading were found to have occurred over an extended period of time. 131 Although stock exchanges like the NYSE have rules for specialist firms to follow, enforcement of these rules has been inadequate. 132 The 2003 SEC Report found that NYSE had no meaningful compliance programs to review their specialists' compliance with NYSE rules, as such rules are often vague and difficult to enforce, provided little or no punishment for abuse, and posed a conflict of interest between NYSE enforcement of rules and the regulation of specialists to essentially "act against their self-interest." they are delegates of the SEC that carry out quasi-governmental duties and serve as the "first-line regulatory authority" over U.S. securities and commodities industries. 135 The "government-like functions and operations" of SROs give rise to the question of which checks and balances and due process considerations may be necessary for SROs to have constitutional and administrative accountability and legitimacy. 136 The fraud exception offers a potential solution to the need for a check on SRO accountability, as this exception would protect SROs when carrying out their quasi-governmental duties while ensuring that plaintiffs have some recourse for those times in which SROs have acted fraudulently.
IV. PLEADING FRAUD AND EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
As examined in Part II of this Article, courts have historically rejected the carving out of a fraud exception from the SRO absolute immunity doctrine.
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It behooves the Court not to carve out a fraud exception to the absolute immunity of an SRO. It is, after all, hard to imagine the plaintiff (or plaintiff's counsel) who would -when otherwise wronged by an SRO but unable to seek money damages -fail to concoct some claim of fraud in order to try and circumvent the absolute immunity doctrine. Thus, rejecting a fraud exception is a 'matter not simply of logic but of intense practicality since [otherwise] the [SRO's] exercise of its quasi-governmental functions would be unduly hampered by disruptive and recriminatory lawsuits'.
138
The courts are concerned that a fraud exception to absolute immunity would cause plaintiffs to conjure up claims of fraud through artful pleading, which, if successful, would overload the courts. However, it is likely that the heightened pleading requirements that are necessary for a successful fraud claim would weed out meritless suits, thereby protecting the judicial system. In addition, the requirement that plaintiffs wishing to challenge SRO actions must first exhaust administrative remedies before invoking the courts offers further protection from a flurry of superfluous lawsuits.
A. Heightened Pleading Requirements for Fraud Claims
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) ("Rule 9(b)"), all pleadings of fraud or mistake must be stated "with particularity," 139 which differs from the general pleading requirements for ordinary civil actions requiring only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." 140 In addition, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA") requires that complaints alleging misrepresentations specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief, all facts on which that belief is formed must be included in the complaint.
141
In private actions in which the plaintiff may recover money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind, the complaint must state "with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind"
142
-knowingly and with the intent to defraud regarding each act or omission. 143 Complaints containing inferences of scienter will only survive if a reasonable person deems such inference "cogent" and "at least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged." 144 "The complaint should set out the 'who, what, when, where and how' of the events at issue. 145 In determining Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss ("12(b)(6) motions"), courts examine the plaintiff's complaint in its entirety, including documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court takes judicial notice. 146 Courts will disregard "catch-all" or "blanket" assertions that do not comply with the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) and the PSRLA.
147
Plaintiffs are also limited as to what materials they may use to formulate their fraud claim. The PSLRA's discovery stay prevents the plaintiff from being able to obtain discovery to construct the allegations of their complaint until the motion to dismiss is resolved. 148 Therefore, plaintiffs' lawyers rely on items like SEC filings, press releases, and witness interviews to construct their fraud claims. 149 For a successful fraud pleading under the PSLRA, plaintiffs must identify specific documents on which their allegations in a complaint are based. 150 Claims brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act also require the strict pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) and PSLRA, as such claims "sound in fraud." 151 To state a claim under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must allege a material misrepresentation or omission, scienter, a connection with the purchase or sale of a security, reliance, economic loss and causation. 152 Liability under Rule 10b-5 for misrepresentations about a security is not limited to the issuer of such security but may be brought against other parties, including underwriters, brokers, banks and non-issuer sellers. 153 The purpose of Rule 9(b) and the PSLRA is to discourage meritless securities fraud suits and to reduce the cost of defending class actions. 154 Plaintiffs are also subject to sanctions for filing "overly prolix pleadings", thereby further discouraging the filing of meritless lawsuits. 155 Private securities fraud actions, if not checked by stringent pleading requirements, could create significant costs on companies and individuals. 156 Studies have shown that the heightened pleading requirements of PSLRA have been successful. The heightened pleading requirements in securities fraud actions contributed to a 39.1% dismissal rate at the pleading stage. 157 The results of a 2004 study reveal that the Ninth Circuit granted dismissals 63% of the time. 158 The number of securities class action settlements under the PSLRA that were approved in 2010
decreased by approximately 15% from 2009. 159 Plaintiffs face increased difficulty in bringing forth complaints that will survive the pleadings stage due to these heightened pleading requirements. Such requirements would help to eliminate meritless suits against SROs, allowing only those that adequately state and support specific instances of fraud. In one case, a buyer of auction rate securities brought an action against Merrill Lynch, as the underwriter of the securities, claiming unlawful acts and misrepresentations in the buyer's purchase of the securities. 160 Plaintiffs alleged scienter by stating that Merrill Lynch's motive in committing alleged fraud was to expand its potential customer base, the size and volume of the products that it underwrote, and the underwriting fees that it generated to collect millions of dollars. 161 In considering these allegations, the court ruled that the defendant's motive to merely increase or maintain profit is insufficient under the PSLRA requirements. 162 "Allegations of a generalized motive that could be imputed to any for-profit endeavor are not concrete enough to infer scienter." 163 Therefore, plaintiffs attempting to sue SROs will not be able to rely solely on the argument that SROs were acting out of private,
proprietary interests.
B. Preliminary Administrative Review of SRO Actions
Plaintiffs are not able to simply run to the judicial system each time they believe that they court of appeals. 165 During the fourth level of review, the SEC may dismiss or modify the disciplinary proceedings of the SRO against an aggrieved member if it finds that the SRO disciplinary action is not necessary or appropriate to further the purposes of the Exchange Act. 166 Given the various layers of review, this process may take several years to complete. 167 Congress viewed this extensive process as beneficial, as the "expertise and intimate familiarity" that SROs and the SEC possess with respect to "complex securities operations" would be ideal in resolving regulatory issues in the securities industry. 168 The rule of exhaustion of prescribed administrative remedies prior to entitlement to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury is a long settled doctrine, 169 as such procedures prevent the "premature interruption" of the administrative process. 170 The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine also allows administrative agencies the chance to correct any errors that SROs may have made, thereby avoiding the need to invoke the court system altogether. 171 There are recognized exceptions to the doctrine when courts may decide to hear cases despite a lack of initial exhaustion of administrative remedies, including when the administrative procedure is inadequate to prevent irreparable injury or when an unambiguous statutory or constitutional violation exists. 172 In Standard Investment Chartered Inc. v. NASD, the district court addressed the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies before the case was appealed to the Second Circuit.
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The defendants argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the plaintiffs' claims since they had failed to first exhaust their administrative remedies. 174 Plaintiffs argued that the exhaustion doctrine was inapplicable based on the argument that it was limited to securities law enforcement issues. 175 The district court acknowledged that plaintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review not only when challenging disciplinary proceedings of SROs, but also with respect to challenges to procedures that are part of SRO's rulemaking authority. 176 "[T]he SEC has power to oversee the procedures incident to rulemaking, which is comparable, if not equal, to its power to review the procedures incident to an SRO's disciplinary proceedings."
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In so deciding, the district court focused on the power of the SEC to amend the rules of an SRO as the SEC deems necessary to ensure compliance with the federal securities laws.
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The court reasoned that the bylaws and articles of incorporation of an SRO also constitute "rules", thereby allowing the SEC to impose any bylaw amendments or disapprove a proposed bylaw amendment without the vote of the SRO's members if such an action were deemed necessary to the fulfillment of the goals of the securities laws. powers that such entities had prior to their registration. 180 Based on this premise, the district court found that the plaintiffs' claims that NASD made fraudulent misrepresentations in its proxy solicitation in connection with its bylaw amendments must be dismissed in favor of the existing SEC review proceeding.
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The institution of a fraud exception may be viewed as a first step in allowing some mechanism for redress in instances of wrongdoing. As the law currently stands, SROs are fully shielded from liability for fraudulent activities as long as such actions were carried out as part of their delegated, regulatory duties. This structure poses a risk for unchecked abuse -the fraud exception is one way of allowing only truly worthy allegations of fraud to stand. The heightened pleading requirements for fraud and the exhaustion doctrine serve as mitigating factors to the concerns most commonly held by fraud exception opponents that such an exception would "unduly hamper" the judicial system. 182 The arguments against the creation of a fraud exception have been centered around the preoccupation that the courts would be overburdened by an excess of frivolous lawsuits by plaintiffs "concocting" 183 a fraud claim just to find a way to sue an SRO.
As the above section has revealed, it is often very difficult for plaintiffs to meet the stringent pleading requirements in a fraud claim, especially considering the limits associated with the PSLRA's stay on discovery and burdensome scienter pleading requirement. The inability of numerous plaintiffs to meet such strict requirements has resulted in many of such cases being dismissed. 184 In addition, plaintiffs' access to the federal court system is blocked by the initial administrative lawyers of review of a plaintiff's challenge to an SRO disciplinary proceeding or rulemaking procedures. Such hurdles create an uphill battle for plaintiffs wishing to seek redress in the federal courts. This doctrine would serve as an additional lawyer of protection in ensuring that only those complaints deserving of a federal court hearing will be granted.
CONCLUSION
SROs are unique organizations that embody characteristics of both profit-seeking corporations and public government agencies. Because of SROs' familiarity with the complexities of the securities markets, such entities have been delegated with the power to regulate their members to ensure the efficient operations of the stock market. 185 SROs institute regulations for compliance with the federal securities laws, imposing disciplinary actions on members that fail to meet these standards. 186 The lines are often blurred between the public and private functions of SROs, as some courts have granted SROs absolute immunity for all actions that are "incident to" carrying out regulatory duties, while others have denied it for actions like advertising that are considered to further private, business interests. 187 Despite some difference of opinion as to when absolute immunity is warranted, courts have refused to carve out a fraud exception to the absolute immunity doctrine.
The fraud exception has been rejected for fear of overloading the courts with suits involving "concoctions" of fraud and for the reason that the SEC is already exercising adequate oversight authority over SROs. 188 Recent findings and events have revealed that the SEC is lacking in many areas of SRO oversight, which creates concern as to whether SROs are being held accountable for actions in which they have acted fraudulently. In addition, regulators have become concerned that the transformation of SROs over past decades from member-owned 185 See supra p. 31. 186 See supra pp. 6-7. 187 See supra Part II, Section A. 188 See supra Part II, Section B.
organizations to "profit-focused" publicly traded companies has been to blame for recent technological shortcomings and failures of stock exchanges, 189 which has had the effect of weakening investor confidence in the markets. Such facts pose the question of whether SROs are still quite as controlled and in check as the courts believe them to be. The availability of a fraud exception to the expansive absolute immunity doctrine would offer plaintiffs the opportunity to hold SROs accountable for acts of fraud and abuse. It is unlikely that such an exception would have the result of creating a flood of meritless suits, as such claims would be subject not only to heightened pleading standards but also to preliminary administrative review by government agencies. 190 These requirements would help to weed out unsupported and undocumented instances of fraud.
The fact that SROs are quasi-governmental actors should not fully shield such organizations from liability without inquiry as to the underlying nature of a plaintiff's claim. A fraud exception to SRO immunity would help to ensure that SROs are held accountable during those times that they may act out of self-interest or engage in fraud in furtherance of their business motives. As this Article has revealed, SROs, although tasked with delegated regulatory powers, have various opportunities to step out of the SEC's regulatory shoes and into those of a private, profit-seeking corporation. It is during such times that those aggrieved by fraudulent SRO actions should have some recourse to justice.
